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Close-Order Combat at the
Battle of the Little Big Horn
The Use of the Model 1873 Colt Revolver
by Albert Winkler

S

cholars have paid much attention to the use of the Model
1873 Springfield Carbine at the
Battle of the Little Big Hom, which
was designed to be used in combat
at relatively long distances, and the
nature, reliability, accuracy and rate
of fire of this weapon has been frequently examined. Yet many other
weapons were involved in the battle, including those wielded at close
quarters. At critical junctions in the
fight, these firearms were important
in the progress of the contest and
contributed significantly to the final outcome of the battle. The purpose of this paper is to assess the
weapons used at close quarters, to
demonstrate their effectiveness, and
to appraise their impact on the encounter.
Indian Weapons

The warriors who faced Custer's
men at the Little Big Horn wielded
a variety of weapons. This included
rifles, pistols, bows and arrows, war
clubs and lances. The lance must
not be confused with javelins or
spears because the lance was used
for thrusting not throwing. The rifles and bows and arrows could be
effective both at short and at long
ranges. Yet pistols could only beeffective at relatively short distances,
and clubs and lances had to be used

D

when the Indians were within reach
of their adversaries. Clearly, the rifles and pistols were devices manufactured by the white culture, and
they were designed to be effective
and easy to use. The use of metal
cartridges also enhanced the ease at
which the weapons could be loaded
and fired.

However, the other weapons
used by the Indians were handcrafted which meant they took relatively
a long time to make, and the bows
and arrows required much skill to
use effectively. These hand-made
weapons also had some cultural
significance for the Indians. This
was especially true of the lances
that much resembled
coup sticks, which warriors often used to "count
coup" on their adversaries by touching them in
an act of bravery. The
bow could also be used
as a means to count
coup, and some of the
warriors facing Custer's
men wanted to get close
to their adversaries and
to demonstrate their
courage in battle.
Cavalry Weapons

Amos Bad Heart Bull, "Six Lances"
Courtesy: University of Nebraska Press

While a few of the
soldiers with the 7th
Cavalry and the auxiliaries, who accompanied
them, carried a variety
of firearms, the standard
issue to the troopers included the .45 caliber
Springfield Model 1873
Trapdoor Carbine and
the Model 1873 .45 cali-
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Colt Model 1873 Revolver
"Description and Rules" (Page 38) Author's Collection.

ber Colt Revolver. The Springfield
carbine was a single-shot weapon.
Once fired, the spent cartridge in
the rifle had to be manually ejected from the weapon by the use of
a trapdoor device before another
cartridge could be loaded into the
weapon. If the piece jammed, a
knife or similar item had to be used
to pry out the spent cartridge. Under optimal conditions, the weapon
could be fired rapidly. After the
carbine had undergone a series of
tests in 1873, the U.S. government
reported:

A practiced person can fire
this arm from 12 to 13 times per
minute.... It has been fired at the
rate o/23 times per minute... , by
an experienced person. 1
While the Springfield was intended for use by the cavalry at a
distance, it could certainly be used
effectively at close range, but it
was not designed as a close-order
weapon that might include handto-hand combat. As a point of comparison, the cavalry version of the
Springfield was nearly identical to
the infantry model, but had simple
modifications designed to make it
effective at close quarters. The cavalry carbine had a shorter barrel (or

thus the gun could be fired much
faster than the carbine. Its main
drawbacks were the fact that it
could only be reloaded slowly and
was largely inaccurate, and therefore ineffective, at long distances.
After the pistol had been fired, each
spent cartridge had to be manually
ejected from the cylinder one at a
time, and each new round had to be
inserted into the chamber individually. This was a slow process, and
it was often impractical to reload
the revolver while riding a horse at
a gallop or under conditions of intense combat.
Ironically, the army also tested
the Schofield Smith & Wesson Revolver in 1873 at the same time it
examined the Colt revolver for effectiveness. While the Schofield
was also a single-action device that
had to be cocked every time it was
fired, it could be reloaded much faster than the Colt because the Schofield had a top-break design which
allowed all six spent cartridges to
be ejected at the same time with
one movement of the wrist. Also,
all six rounds could be more rapidly
loaded without turning the cylinder.

bore) at 22 inches, while the infantry model's barrel was 32.6 inches in
length. Also, the wood forend (front
end or forearm) of the infantry model was almost as long as the barrel,
while the forend of the carbine was
much shorter than the barrel. The
infantry model was also designed to
accommodate a bayonet, so it could
be used effectively to jab into an enemy, while the cavalry carbine had
no such capability. After it had been
discharged, and if there was little
time to reload the weapon, the carbine could only be used like a club
in close combat. As such, it was
very cumbersome device
and would only be used
in that manner in times of
complete desperation.
On the other hand, the
.45 caliber Colt revolver
used by the cavalry was
designed for close-order
combat. It was a singleaction pistol, meaning its
hammer had to be cocked
and the trigger had to be
pulled each time to fire
the weapon.
While the cavalry carbine was a single-shot
weapon the pistol carried
Schofield Smith & Wesson Revolver
six rounds, so it was often In open position "Describtion and Rules" (Page 44)
called a six-shooter, and
Author's Collection
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These advantages greatly increased
the speed at which the pistol could
be reloaded, a critical factor in its
use during times of intense combat.
Despite the Schofield's advantages,
the army selected the Colt and issued it to the troopers in Custer's
command. 2
The cavalrymen typically went
into battle with their Colt pistols fully loaded with a round in each cylinder. As 1st Sgt. John Ryan stated,
the soldiers carried "24 rounds of
pistol ammunition." 3 This was a perfect number of rounds for the men
to be able to load their revolvers
completely four times. There was
no necessity of leaving one chamber of the cylinder empty under the
hammer for safety reasons because
the weapon had a "Safety Notch,"
so that an accidental discharge of
the device was highly unlikely. As
the manual describing the basic features of the weapon stated, "Besides
the full-cock and half-cock notches,
there is also a Safety Notch, which is
the first one felt in cocking the pistol. " 4 When the hammer was cocked
in the safety position, the weapon
could not be discharged.
On July 11 , 1876, only 15 days
after the Little Big Hom, Major
Marcus Reno reported on the number of rounds used by the army in
the battle:
Amt. Ammunition exp 'd. Carbine, 38,030 rounds [Amt.
Ammunition exp' d. ]- Pistol,
2,954 [rounds]. 5

Clearly, the soldiers used the carbine more extensively than they did
the pistol, but the revolver was still
very important to the outcome of
the battle especially at critical junctures in the engagement.
Many troopers in the 7th Cavalry
took pride in their unit and in their

rm

weapons, including the pistols. As
Pvt. Charles Windolph, stated:
You f elt you were somebody
when you were on a good horse,
with a carbine dangling from
its small leather ring socket on
your McClellan saddle, and a
Colt army revolver strapped on
your hip; and a hundred rounds
of ammunition in y our web belt
and in your saddle pockets, You
were a cavalryman of the 7th
Regiment. You were part of a
proud outfit that had a .fighting
reputation, and y ou were ready
for a.fight or frolic. "6

The range of the army Colt
1873 revolver was demonstrated
at the Little Big Hom in a dramatic
fashion. This occurred when Lt.
Winfield Edgerly saw Maj. Marcus Reno acting erratically after
his force retreated from the valley
fight to take up positions on Reno
Hill, "He [Reno] was in an excited
condition. As we came up he turned
and discharged his pistol towards
the Indians." According to Edgerly,
the Indians were "about a thousand
yards" away which was "nine hundred yards beyond any effective
range" of the pistol. 7
From my own observations, I
can confirm Edgerly's assessment
on the range of the cavalry pistol.
I have an exact replica of the army
Colt Model 1873 .45 caliber revolver carried by the men in the 7th Cavalry. Using modem ammunition, I
have tested the accuracy and range
of the pistol many times, and I'm
convinced that the revolver could
be effective at 100 yards and perhaps lethal at some greater ranges.
Yet its relatively low muzzle velocity, as compared to the Model 1873
Springfield Carbine, meant that the
accuracy of the pistol beyond 100

yards would be uncertain at best,
and its penetrating power would be
much reduced as well at long distances. Additionally, the weapon's
sights are only designed for shortrange firing. Even a very good shot
would have trouble hitting a mark
over 100 yards away, and striking
a target at greater ranges would involve more luck than skill.
Close Order Combat in
Reno's Valley Fight

However, the pistol was effective at close range, which was first
demonstrated early in the battle.
The cavalry initially encountered
the Indians when Maj. Reno's command crossed the Little Big Hom
River and advanced on the Indian
village. This detachment included
about 140 men in Companies A, G
and M, and according to Lt. Wallace, "There were 22 scouts" including auxiliaries with the detachment. 8 These men never reached
their objective because hundreds
of warriors swarmed from the encampment and threatened Reno 's
column forcing them to stop their
advance.
Yet at least one trooper, Pvt. John
H. Meier of Company M, lost control of his mount which took him towards the village. Pvt. Daniel Newel stated that Meier 's "horse got
away from him and bolted through
the Indian's line." The trooper could
have been cut off and killed, and he
was in a desperate situation, but
he pulled out his pistol to fight his
way back to the cavalry lines. As
Newell reported, "but he got back
to us, shooting his way out with his
six gun ... how he ever did this is a
mystery." No doubt, Meier used his
pistol skillfully.9
In the valley fight and retreat to
Reno Hill, 34 or 35 soldiers and ci-
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Number of troopers in
Reno's command in the
Valley Fight.*
Company A, Capt. Myles Moylan
On Roster = 54
AtLBH
= 46
Pack Train = -7
Horse Holders = -9
Dismounted On Skirmish Line = 30
Company G, 1st Lt. Donald McIntosh
On Roster = 67
AtLBH = 43
Pack Train = -7
Horse Holders = -9
Dismounted on Skirmish Line = 27
Company M, Capt. Thomas French
On Roster = 63
AtLBH = 55
Pack Train = -7
Horse Holders = -12
Dismounted on Skirmish Line = 36

Frederic Remington "On the Southern Plains"

Troopers on the Skirmish Line: 93

Courtesy Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York

*Infonnation from Ronald H. Nichols (editor), Men With Custer: Biographies of the 7th Cavalry (Hardin:
MT: Custer Battlefield Historical &
Museum Assn ., 2010), 448, 454, 459.

vilians with the cavalry were killed,
many of them at close distances.
The discrepancy in numbers, between 34 and 35 deaths, at that part
of the battle is due to the fact that no
one knew if Pvt. Benjamin F. Rogers was killed during Reno's retreat
from the valley or in the defense of
Reno Hill. Either case is plausible. 10
These fatalities give some indication of the intensity of the combat,
and many of these men were killed
by combat at short distances.
Reno's valley fight was the first
time the cavalry engaged the Indians, and it was also the first instance
of combat at close quarters. When
Reno saw the large numbers of
warriors riding from the village to
meet his advance, the commander
ordered his men to dismount to face
them because he believed his men
could fire more effectively and accurately on foot. This reduced the
number of troopers on the skirmish
line to about 93. [See Sidebar]
Some of the close fighting took
place when the soldiers had dis-

mounted to form the skirmish line.
However, most of the close fighting
took place later, during Reno's retreat from the timber after the initial
encounter.
The Indians soon started to
sweep around the left flank of his
command, and Reno ordered his
men to fall back to the timber rather
than face the possibility of being
surrounded and cut to pieces. During the movement to the timber the
cavalrymen could not use their carbines effectively so the troopers had
to rely on their pistols to prevent the
Indians from from cutting off the retreat to the timber. 11
Lt. George Wallace of Company
G stated that Reno's men were in a
dangerous situation when the Indians closed in, and the soldiers had
to fight their way out of a possible
encirclement. When Wallace described this critical juncture of the
fight, he stated that the soldiers did
not have sabers, which was a weapon that could be used at close quarters. At the Reno Court oflnquiry in

1879, he was asked, "Did they [the
soldiers] have sabers?" Wallace answered, "No, sir, there was not a saber in the command." 12 Lt. Charles
Varnum also confirmed the fact that
there were no sabers in the command, but he did so less enthusiastically. When he was asked, "Did any
of the officers enter that fight with
sabers or swords?" he answered,
"Not that I know of, I almost know
there was not a saber in the command. " 13 If the soldiers had brought
sabers with them to the battle, they
would have had another weapon to
use in close-order combat.
Wallace was also asked to explain the use of pistols in the engagement, "Did they [the soldiers]
have revolvers?" He replied, "Yes,
sir." The lieutenant was then asked,
"After a cavalryman expends the
cartridges from his revolver, his revolver is useless?" to which he re-
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sponded, "Yes, sir." 14 Wallace gave
details on the nature of the combat
in the valley fight:
The Indians were in the bottom and we were riding through
them and as we would ride
along they would either fire or
ride along by the men andfire at
them [at a close range]. 15

Lt. Wallace stated further:
In getting out ofthere we had
to go through the Indians. There
was but one way to get through
and that was to charge through.

He added:
The men were in column-of/ours and as they would come up
to the Indians the Indians would
give way and let them pass
through and then fire into them.

After the men passed through
if they saw that a man was not
using his pistol they would ride
close to him and fire. I know I
found one within 10 feet of me.
They would ride along with the
men and shoot at them.

all directions is not a matter
largely of discretion with the individual soldier.

Wallace also offered the opinion that the warriors were most effective at close distance, when he
testified, "If they [the Indians] had
closed in there were plenty of them
to have made short work ofus." 16
Again at the Reno Court of Inquir, Lt. Wallace was cross examined, and he stated that the decision
to use pistols was largely left up to
the soldiers. At one point, the lieutenant was asked: "You say as you
went back the Indians rode up and
fired on the cavalrymen who were
not using their pistols, what was the
reason the men did not use their pistols?" Wallace responded, "Probably they had fired the
6 rounds." The next
question was, "And
their pistols were
empty?" to which
he responded, "Yes,
sir." 17 Wallace was
also asked, "Is not the
firing of pistols by a
cavalryman a matter of discretion?" To
which he answered,
"Yes, sir." 18 In his testimony, Capt. Myles
Moylan of Company
A affi1med Wallace's
statement.
When
asked:

Lt. Varnum of Company A gave
further information on the Indians
using Winchester rifles at close distances during the valley fight when
the troopers were falling back from
their original position:

Amos Bad Heart Bull,
"Battle of the Little Big Horn"
Courtesy: University of Nebraska Press

m

State whether,
under the circumstances, the firing of cavalrymen
against
Indians
that are moving in

The captain answered:
It is. 19

As a rule they [the warriors]
fire from their horses and they
were scampering around pumping their Winchester rifles into
us.20

He further added:
When I came out there were a
good many Indians scampering
along with their Winchesters
across their saddles firing into
the column [of soldiers ].2 1

Varnum also gave information
on how the troopers met the Indian
threat during the retreat by using
their pistols at close range:
A great many ofthe men were
using their revolvers.

He added:
If there was a charge to pass
through a body ofIndians I think
in column-of-fours would be a
good formation with the number of men at his disposal, That
would give the men an opportunity to use their revolvers, they
could not use their carbines. 22

Varnum also indicated that the
column-of-fours formation did not
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last long in a battlefield situation,
"by the time you go 100 yards the
men will not be in their places."23
Moylan also testified that his company had lost its formation and suffered heavy casualties in the retreat
in Reno's valley fight:

I found the rear ofmy company
was very much broken up, as the
shooting into it was very severe. 24
Lt. Varnum was also asked if the
Indians charged into Major Reno's
column during the retreat. He responded:

They did not charge into it.
They would ride some distance
off on the flank, some 50 to I 00
yards, with their rifles across
the pommels of their saddles
and would sit there and work
their rifles.
Apparently, these statements
surprised the court, and an obvious question followed. Varnum was
then asked if the Indians brought
the rifles to the shoulder to aim and
fire, "No, sir," was the response.
They "let them lay across their
saddles."25 Sgt. Ferdinand A. Culbertson of Company A agreed with
Varnum 's observations on how the
warriors used their guns.

They [the Indians] were riding alongside and firing from
the pommels of their saddles
and some fired pistols as we
came along. 26
He added:

There was great danger in
passing out [towards the trees],
The Indians rode along side of
us about 8 or IO deep, firing
most of the time into us. 27

Major Reno affirmed that the Indians shot into the mass of soldiers
during their retreat in the valley:

I stopped at the river a moment.... They were exposed to
heavy fire from the Indians and I
lost a good many men there. The
Indians had Winchester rifles,
and the column made a large
target for them, and they were
pumping bullets into it.28
Reno went so far as to state that
the Indians wielded no other firearms but the Winchester rifle.
Firing their rifles across the pommels of their saddles only made
sense if the warriors were shooting
at close range because they had little
chance of hitting their targets at any
distance. Perhaps the Indians were
not aiming specifically at the soldiers but were firing into the mass
of troopers hoping to hit either the
men or their horses. The lever-action Winchester rifles could be used
effectively at close range because a
spent cartridge could be ejected and
a new round could be sent into the
firing chamber of the weapon with
a flick of the wrist on the operating
lever. The use of Winchester rifles
also had a distinct advantage over
the lever-action Henry rifle. When
a Henry needed to be reloaded, the
user had to hold the weapon in a
vertical position to drop rounds into
the magazine. That would be a very
challenging operation on horseback
and in battle. The Winchester could
be reloaded by pushing rounds into
its side magazine when the weapon
was in a horizontal position, so the
device could be reloaded while the
operator was on horseback and under battlefield conditions.
The Acting Assistant Surgeon,
Henry Porter, who accompanied
Reno's command, refused to carry

a weapon, so technically he did not
fight in the battle. Yet he was in a
position to observe much of the
combat. He later testified that the
warriors were often very close to
the soldiers during Reno's retreat
during the valley fight:

When I got out [retreated
from the timber] the men were
running and the Indians were
running too within a few yards
of where I was. There were a
few Indians between the command and me and I went out
expecting to find the command
charging the Indians but instead of that, I found the Indians charging the command. 29
Later, Dr. Porter also stated that
many of the Indians fought very
close to the soldiers when he was
asked if he could estimate the number of warriors in the engagement.
He responded by saying that the
warriors and soldiers were very
close to each other:

They [the Indians] were
mixed up with the troops to
the right and rear so that I can
not tell [their numbers]. I think
there were two or three hundred. 30
Private Edward Davern saw
something similar at about the same
time, "I looked around ... , and I saw
the G Company men were mixed
up with the Indians." 3 1
Indian pictographs provide further insights into the nature of the
combat in Reno's valley fight.
These illustrations often depict
combat at close quarters including the soldiers firing their pistols,
and the warriors were using pistols,
rifles, clubs, lances and bows and
arrows, also at close distances.

m
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peded horses. The Indians
then ran up to the soldiers
and butchered them with
hatchets.33
Later in an interview Chief
Gall was asked, "Did the red
men shoot guns or arrows?"
The war chief responded,

Both, we soon shot all our
cartridges, and then shot arrows and used our war clubs.
He added,

Red Horse "Reno's Retreat
Courtesy of the National Anthropological
Archives Smithsonian Institution.

The warrior, One Bull, later reported that he killed three troopers using a war club in the valley
fight, "I followed the soldiers. They
were running for the river, I killed
two with my tomahawk." He added
that he killed another trooper who
was retreating to Reno Hill, "I went
across the river after the soldiers, I
killed one more of them with my
tomahawk. " 32
Close-order Combat at
Custer's Last Stand
When the five companies under
Custer's personal control were annihilated, much of the combat took
place at close distances. As Chief
Gall stated:

The soldiers ran out of ammunition early in the day. Their
supply of cartridges was in the
saddle-pockets of their stam-

m

They [the troopers] shot
away all [the ammunition]
they had. The horses ran
away, carrying in the saddle
pockets a heap more, The
soldiers threw their guns
[carbines] aside and fought
with the little guns [pistols]. 34
The Indians affirmed the
effectiveness of the cavalry
pistol when Custer's column was
overwhelmed. The warrior, Homed
Horse, observed:

As it was, a great number of
Indians fell, the soldiers using
their revolvers at close range
with deadly effect. More Indians died by the pistol than by
the carbine. The latter weapon
was always faulty. It "leaded"
uammed] easily and the cartridge shells stuck in the breech
the moment it became heated,
owing to some defect in the
ejector. 35 [See Sidebar]
One must wonder if the outcome
of the battle could have been altered if the troopers were wielding
the Schofield Smith & Wesson Revolver which would have allowed
them to reload their pistols much
more rapidly.

Problems with the Model 1873
Springfield Carbine
The problems with the cavalry carbine
were affirmed in several accounts. Major
Reno stated, "An Indian scout [probably
Curley], who was with that portion of the
regiment which Custer took into battle,
in relating what he saw of that part of
the battle, says that from his hiding place
he could see the men sitting down under
fire, and working at their guns- a story
that finds confirmation in the fact that officers, who afterwards examined the battle-field as they were burying the dead,
found knives with broken blades lying
near the dead bodies." 36
Capt. James W. Reilly, Chief Ordinance Officer, explained the problems
with the cartridges. They "had become
covered with a coating of verdigris [deposit of copper carbonates] and extraneous matter, which had made it difficult to
even put them in the chamber before the
gun had been discharged at all. Upon discharge the verdigris and extraneous matter formed a cement with held the sides
of the cartridge in place against the action of the ejector, resulting in the separation of the head of the cartridge from the
body and its ejector alone." 37
Lt. Charles DeRudio was asked,
"How many rounds of ammunition could
the men fire from their guns without
heating them?" He testified, "Not a great
many, I noticed that the men had to take
their knives to extract cartridges after firing 8 or 10 rounds." 38 Lt. Edward Godfrey, stated that one of the reasons "why
Custer was defeated" was "the defective
extraction of the empty cartridge- shells
from the carbines ...the ejectors did not
always extract the empty shells from the
chambers, and the men were compelled
to use knives to get them out."39
The trooper, Charles Windolph, believed the extractor problems caused the
deaths of many men, "When fired rapidly
the breech became foul and the greasy
cartridges often jammed and could not
be removed by the extractor. This meant
that the empty shell had to be forced out
by the blade of a hunting knife. This
very fact was responsible for the death
of many a trooper this hot Sunday [June
25, 1876], and may actually have been
the indirect cause of the great disaster."40
Another trooper, Pvt. William C. Slaper,
said Capt. Thomas French "would extract shells from guns in which cartridges
would stick." 4 1
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Red Horse "Custer Column Fighting"
Courtesy of the National Anthropological Archives Smithsonian Institution.

Numerous drawings made by
the Indians depict various aspects
of the battle. Often, when they portrayed the fighting when Custer's
five companies were overwhelmed,
the artists showed the soldiers using pistols and the warriors using
pistols, clubs and lances that were
clearly being wielded at close distances. Also, depictions of hand-tohand combat were presented. 42
The warrior, Wooden Leg, also
related that another soldier was
killed using his pistol just before
he was killed. When it appeared
that all the soldiers had been killed,
one of the men raised himself onto
his left elbow, "He turned and
looked over his left shoulder, and
then I got a good view of him.
His expression was wild, as if his
mind was all tangled up and he
was wondering what was going on
here." He held a "six-shooter" in
his hand. An Indian took the pistol
away from him and killed him with
it. 43

Soon after the battle, Lt. Edward
Maguire visited the location where
Custer's men were annihilated and
later testified that he saw physical
evidence that the army used pistols
in the battle. "There were government shells and Winchester shells
and one peculiar brass shell was
found that nobody knew anything
about but which was supposed to
belong to General Custer's pistol."44
Close Combat on Reno Hill

After retreating from the valley fight, Reno 's men fell back to
defensive positions on Reno Hill,
The survivors were soon joined by
Capt. Frederick Benteen's command, comprised of Companies D,
H, and K. Also, Capt. Thomas McDougall's Company B, which was
protecting the pack train, soon approached.
McDougall could hear the gunfire from the valley fight, and he believed he was entering a battlefield

situation, so he ordered his men to
advance as though they were attacking. As he explained later, "I
told my company we would have
to charge that party and get to the
command. We drew our pistols. I
put one platoon in front of the pack
train and one in the rear, and charged
to where those persons were. " 45
After the men assembled on
Reno Hill, the arms used by the
men in and with the 7th Cavalry
changed slightly because the citizen packers had different weapons
and were not deployed in the same
way to face the Indians. John Frett,
a citizen packer, testified. He was
asked "What were your duties as a
packer in regard to fighting or anything of that sort?" To which he
responded, "We had no orders in
regard to fighting, and we had no
weapons except revolvers." He was
then asked to clarify that statement,
"None of the citizen packers had
any weapons except revolvers?"
He affirmed, "No, sir." 46
Lt. Edward Mathey of Company
M had a slightly different take on the
situation when he was asked, "Did
you order all of the men with the
pack train out on the [battle] line?"
He responded, "Yes, sir." Again,
he was asked, "Were the citizen
packers armed? If so, with what?"
He further clarified the situation,
"Some came to me for carbines and
I told them to pick them up if any of
the wounded men had left them, or
anywhere they could find them." 47
Some of the fighting on Reno
Hill occurred at closer distances, including one of the most significant
junctures in the battle. The fight for
the hill started on June 25, 187 6, but
it ended when the sun went down,
and the men on either side could no
longer see to shoot well. The battle
renewed the next morning. As Lt.
Charles DeRudio explained, pistol

m
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shots signaled the renewal of combat on the following day, "About
half past four o'clock, that Indian
standing at the point fired four shots
with his pistol, in the air, which I
considered a signal." He added,
"About half an hour after the same
Indian fired four more shots in the
air and the same Indian that had
called out the first time, called out
again."48
Benteen's Company H was in an
exposed prominence that protruded
from Reno Hill to the south, and
the Indians fired into both sides of
the position. The most critical point
was the "horseshoe" at the end of
the line, and it was defended by
only eight or ten men. Fortunately,
only three of the men in Company
H were killed in the battle, but 19
were reportedly wounded, and the
battle casualties numbered nearly
half of the soldiers in the company.
The company was vulnerable from
attack on two sides, and if that unit
gave way, the entire defense on
Reno Hill could collapse.
Benteen got reinforcements from
Company M, but the situation was
still precarious. The warriors were
so close that they "were amusing
themselves by throwing clods of
dirt, [and] arrows by hand" at the
troops. 49 Benteen also asserted that
one warrior was so close that he
"touched one of the dead men [soldiers] with a coup stick." 50 Major
Reno gave more information on the
warrior counting coup.

They [the Indians] were making a last desperate effort and
which was directed against the
lines held by Companies H and
M In this charge they came
close enough to use their bows
and arrows, and one man lying dead within our lines was
touched with the coup stick of
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one of the foremost Indians.
When I say the stick was only
ten or twelve feet long, some
idea of the desperate and reckless fighting of these people may
be understood. 51

was getting mad, and I wanted them to charge down the
ravines with me when I gave
the yell: then each to yell as
if provided with a thousand
throats.

Benteen stated that some of the
Indians were only "12 feet" from
the cavalry position. 52 Capt. Moylan
had a similar opinion,

Benteen later admitted he had
no "real trust" in the plan's chances of success, but he thought he
had to try something. 55
The few soldiers who ran forward towards the Indians were
probably outnumbered. In doing
so, the troopers became more easy
targets. If the warriors had stood
and fought, the troopers could
have suffered serious casualties,
but the Indians turned and fled.
Benteen said that the attack was
such a surprise to the warriors that
some of them "somersaulted and
vaulted as so many trained acrobats" in their hasty attempts to get
away. Trooper Charles Windolph,
who went with the attack, also described the scene:

I saw a dead Indian very
close to his [Benteen's] line ....
They came up there within I 5 or
20 yards. There were a considerable many of them. There was
a sufficient number of them to
warrant their attempting to turn
that end of the line. 53
The Indians appeared to be massing for an attack on Benteen's Company H and M that would obviously
include hundreds of warriors and
could overwhelm the cavalry's position at the horseshoe. The warriors
were advancing on foot and "singing some kind of war cry." Many of
the soldiers' rifles were also becoming hard to use.

Our guns had by this time
been.fired so long without cleaning that the shells stuck badly
and [the] guns kicked so hard
it became extremely irksome to
fire them. 54
The situation was desperate, and
Benteen decided on a bold venture
that could easily have been suicidal. He ordered some of his men, no
more than a few dozen, to attack
their enemies on foot. The captain
told how he inspired his men to risk
their lives in the attack:

I walked along the front of
my troop and told them that I

Yelling and firing, we went
at the "double quick" and the
Indians broke and ran. When
we had cleaned them out for a
hundred yards ahead of us, we
hustled back to our holes. 56
The attack had been a big success, and the Indians never rallied
and massed to storm the position
agam.
The cavalry revolvers could
have been a key to the success
of Company H's attack on foot.
Even if their rifles had functioned
properly, their rate of fire was so
slow and the reloading of them so
cumbersome as to make them of
highly questionable value in the
attack. But the men could fire their
revolvers rapidly and effectively
at close range, making their use
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possibly an important aspect of the
attack's success.
While the courageous attack by
Companies H and M had stabilized
their positions and removed the
threat of being overwhelmed, the
other companies on Reno Hill were
still in danger. Benteen was obviously impressed with the success
of the charge made by the two companies, and he decided that such an
advance by the other companies
could have the same fortunate outcome. Hundreds oflndians pressed
close to the defensive position held
by the troopers on Reno Hill. The
warriors seemed to be closing in,
and they continued to threaten the
soldiers.
Benteen believed that desperate
action again needed to be taken to
keep the army's adversaries at a distance, and he talked with a number
of officers suggesting that their men
advance against the warriors. The
captain talked with officers in Companies A (Moylan and Varnum), D
(Edgerly), K (Godfrey), B (McDougall), and G (Wallace). He also convinced Major Reno that the action
was necessary.
Lt. Edgerly of Company D described Benteen's actions at that
time:

Captain Benteen came over
and stood near where I was on a
high point. The bullets were flying very fast there and I did not
see why he was not riddled. He
was perfectly calm. I remember
there was a smile on his face.
He said to Major Reno, "we
have charged the Indians from
our side and driven them out.
They are coming to our left and
you ought to drive them out. "
Major Reno was convinced and
said "give the command to charge."

Benteen then turned to the men,
"All right, ready boys, now charge
and give them hell!" 57
Lt. Godfrey listed three units
used in the advance,

and away we went with a hurrah, every man of the troops 'B, '
'D, 'and 'K' but one, who lay in
his pit crying like a child. 58
Capt. McDougall of Company B
gave additional information on the
companies involved in the attack:

I was only paying attention
to my own company, but on retiring I saw Lieutenants Varnum
[Co. A] and Hare [Co. K] and
Captain Weir [Co. D]. 59
The testimonies of Godfrey and
McDougall indicated that companies A, B, D, and K were involved
in the attack, and Lt. Wallace inferred that Company G participated
as well.
The men did not advance far, Lt.
Edgerly of Company D, said the
men only rushed forward. "Probably 40 or 50 yards." 60 Varnum
stated that his men did not advance
that far:

Then everybody got up
and it was a rush, it was not a
charge.... We probably went up
15 to 10 yards and everybody
[the Indians] scattered out of
there. You could see the whole
outfit skipping out to the hills
beyond. 6 1
Company B under the command
of Capt. McDougall advanced a
slightly longer distance during the
attack. His men went "about 60
yards when the firing was so heavy
on my right and rear that I had to
retire to our original position."62

The troopers probably advanced
with their revolvers in one hand and
their rifles in the other. Since they
could fire their pistol effectively
with one hand, these soldiers likely
shot their revolvers as they rushed
forward. This meant they could
have fired a considerable number
of shots, maybe in just a few seconds, which is about the time it
would have taken the men to cover
from 10 to 60 yards on foot. These
five companies in total could have
had over 200 men available to participate in the attack, but the actual
number was probably less. Yet these
troopers had considerable firepower
in their pistols, and they could have
fired hundreds of rounds in a short
time during their advance. The success of these attacks could have depended as much on the rate of fire
from the men's pistols as on the Indians' surprise at their advance.
These attacks on foot, especially
if the soldiers showed the firepower
of their pistols, could have had a
strong mental impact on the warriors facing the cavalry. The Indians fell back, which ended the last
real threat to the soldiers' position
on Reno Hill. The troopers showed
impressive firepower at that time,
and they could certainly demonstrate that feat again if the warriors
attempted to advance on the cavalry's position. The Indians may
have considered this possibility as
the fighting diminished in the afternoon.
Conclusion

Close-order combat was an essential feature in each of the three
major phases of the Battle of the
Little Big Horn including Reno's
valley fight, the annihilation of
Custer's battalion, and the siege
of Reno hill. The Indians used war
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clubs and lances effectively the first
two encounters, and the use of these
weapons allowed them to inflict
more casualties on the soldiers, but
it was the cavalry pistol that helped
the cavalry in both the valley fight
and in the siege of Reno Hill. In
these engagements, the skillful use
of the revolver allowed many troopers to survive and hold their positions against the Indians.
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